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The year was 2000. The City of Los Angeles had discovered 
widespread corruption in its police department. About seventy 
officers were under investigation, and hundreds of convictions were 
likely to be overturned because of official misconduct.1 Citizens 
reading their newspapers must have wondered: “What can we do so 
that these abuses will never happen again?”  
And that question led to a more basic puzzle: Why had things 
turned out so badly at the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), 
in the first place? 
“The lines between right and wrong became fuzzy and 
indistinct,” former officer Rafael Perez explained at his sentencing 
hearing.2 “The ‘us against them’ ethos of the overzealous cop began 
to consume me.”3 With his voice quavering, Perez added:  
To do our job fairly was not enough. My job became an intoxicant 
that I lusted after. I can only say I succumbed to the seductress of 
power. Used wrongfully, it is a power that can bend the will of a 
man to satisfy a lustful moment. It can open locked vaults to 
facilitate theft. It can even subvert justice to hand down a lifetime 
behind bars.4 
But even with all of his candor, Perez’s explanation remained 
incomplete. His testimony did not shed any light upon the 
mechanism by which he and his fellow officers were induced to 
“succumb to the seductress of power.” It did not show how to 
distinguish dangerous situations, in which bad behavior was likely to 
develop, from cases in which officers did not abuse their authority. 
Perez’s testimony also did not tell us how to minimize the likelihood 
of similar misconduct in the future. 
 
 1. Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Ex-Officer Gives Tearful Apology at His Sentencing, 
HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 26, 2000, at A2. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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I. FROM ABU GHRAIB PRISON TO ENRON CORPORATION 
Obviously, the LAPD is not the only organization in which good 
people sometimes go bad. At Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, American 
jailers photographed each other committing acts of abuse against 
detainees, thereby subjecting themselves to prosecution and losing 
credibility for the United States.5 At Enron Corporation, executives 
tolerated and committed pervasive acts of fraud that lost billions of 
dollars for shareholders.6 Observers wondered how individuals in 
these cases had gone so far wrong. In fact, the questions raised by 
the Los Angeles experience are raised by countless other events in 
which ordinary people, who otherwise seem unlikely to become 
criminals, do in fact engage in criminal activity. More than that: 
ordinary people, when influenced by groups, sometimes engage in 
repeated and open crimes and have seemingly lost their moral 
compass. 
This Article attempts to illuminate the social psychology that 
explains and predicts these occurrences. Specifically, the Article 
investigates cognitive dissonance, group effects, conformity, 
authority, persuasion, and entrapment in escalation, in an effort to 
explain how a person can “succumb to the seductress” in the ways 
that Rafael Perez and his fellow LAPD officers did in 2000. Social 
science, it must be said at the beginning, is an inexact science, unlike 
physics.7 It provides only examples from experiments—only partial 
theories—which require so much extrapolation that certainty is often 
difficult. 
This Article does not deal with evil that is propagated by persons 
with mental disorders, such as those with antisocial personalities,8 
and it does not explain solitary individuals whose conduct is 
motivated by financial gain or by personal desires, such as burglars or 
violent predators. Instead, it concentrates on the individual whose 
place within an organization, or whose relation to a group, is part of 
 
 5. See PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD 
PEOPLE TURN EVIL 18 (2007) (containing social psychologist Philip Zimbardo’s analysis of 
events at Abu Ghraib); see also Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Graib, NEW YORKER, May 
10, 2004, at 42–47 (containing a literary, quasi-journalistic account). 
 6. Bethany McLean et al., Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58–68. 
 7. For a discussion of the limits of the scientific method in psychology, see DAVID 
CRUMP, HOW TO REASON ABOUT THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 351–54 (2001). 
 8. For a discussion of these issues, see id. at 358, 360. 
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the influence toward crime: in other words, on the situation in which 
good people are influenced toward evil by their peers and leaders. 
The Article applies the lessons of social science to the law by 
analyzing the kinds of prohibitions, prescriptions, or incentives that 
might be most effective to avoid antisocial behavior in given 
situations. A final section provides the author’s conclusions 
concerning potential responses to these situations, which include the 
insight that when we write legal standards that affect individuals 
within groups, it is important to write them so that they can be 
enforced not just when evil already is widespread, but continuously 
and proactively as well. 
II. COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND RELATED PHENOMENA9 
A. Festinger’s Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 
Festinger’s Theory of Cognitive Dissonance is one of the more 
important developments in social psychology. Stated in ordinary 
language, it explains how people “rationalize” bad behavior.10 Leon 
Festinger theorized that there is a mental tension created by 
contradictory perceptions, which he called “cognitive dissonance.”11 
The theory can be summarized by saying that “behavior determines 
attitudes, as well as the other way around,”12 because individuals are 
motivated to reduce the tension (or dissonance) by modifying their 
attitudes to fit their perceptions of their own behavior. The mind, in 
other words, rationalizes bad behavior—or justifies it—by changing 
the actor’s cognition (the attitude that conflicts with it), to make bad 
behavior seem not so bad. But this neutral explanation understates 
the scary side of Festinger’s great insight. To put it more plainly, the 
theory predicts that people who commit acts that other people 
would unhesitatingly label as evil will come to view those acts as 
 
 9. Substantial portions of this section, as well as the table in Section III, appeared in 
DAVID CRUMP, HOW TO REASON ABOUT THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (2001), and are reprinted here with permission. 
 10. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957) 
(setting out the theory in detail); Leon Festinger, Cognitive Dissonance, SCI. AM., Oct. 1962, 
at 93, 93–102 (same). 
 11. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 377–78; see ELLIOT ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (2005); ROBERT A. BARON & DONN BYRNE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 144–53 
(9th ed. 2000); THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 309–11 (2006); see also 
supra note 10. 
 12. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 377. 
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good, or at least as not so evil. And they will do so because this 
attitudinal change makes their minds feel more comfortable or less 
dissonant. 
The implications of Festinger’s theory are wide-ranging, and 
observed effects from varied settings support it. “For example, a 
subject who has been made to harm another person with electric 
shocks during an experiment tends to begin disparaging the 
victim.”13 This attitude reduces the dissonance. Prisoners who 
initially despise “snitches” tend to see crime prevention as noble after 
they have begun to collaborate with prison authorities.14 As another 
example, game theorists have noted that subjects induced to bid in 
auctions tend to value the prize more if they have invested heavily in 
it.15 Even such mundane experiences as a long wait at a bus stop can 
be analyzed in dissonance terms. The theory predicts, ironically, that 
the longer one has waited, the more one is motivated to justify the 
delay, or even to wait longer, to reduce the tension between a 
perception that one has invested in waiting and the attitude that the 
investment is not worthwhile. Then, there is the recognized fact that 
during voir dire in lawsuits, examining jurors about their attitudes is 
difficult. “Does anyone in this jury panel have any ‘prejudices’? Any 
‘preconceived notions’ about the issues in this case?” Every member 
of a jury panel has preconceived notions, and arguably, everyone has 
prejudices. Cognitive dissonance, however, prevents most people 
from admitting them, because it prevents them from recognizing 
their prejudices.16 
B. Zimbardo’s Prison Simulation: Role-Playing and the Dissonance 
Phenomenon 
Psychologist Phillip Zimbardo designed an experiment related to 
dissonance theory that produced disturbing results. He designated 
randomly chosen students as “guards,” provided them with 
paraphernalia such as uniforms and badges, and gave them a set of 
 
 13. Id. at 378; see also ARONSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 416–18 (explaining the 
blaming-the-victim phenomenon). 
 14. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 378. 
 15. See infra notes 24–33 and accompanying text (evaluating the entrapment-in-
escalation phenomenon). 
 16. KENNY F. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND CLINICAL SKILLS: IN A NUTSHELL 194 (4th ed. 
2005) (“You cannot inquire directly, as very few believe themselves prejudiced.”). 
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“rules” to enforce. He assigned other students to play the parts of 
“prisoners,” restricted to cell-like spaces and wearing jail clothing.17 
After an initial tentativeness, both groups began to behave as if 
the simulation were real. “Guards” imposed increasingly degrading 
punishments upon “prisoners,” who rebelled or passively endured.18 
Zimbardo actually found it necessary to terminate the experiment 
prematurely.19 Role-playing, it appears, tends to induce attitudes that 
conform to the role. The “guards” tended to evaluate the 
importance of the “rules” and to disparage reactions of prisoners 
when the guards administered punishment for perceived infractions.  
Dissonance theory may explain the reason. The guards changed 
their attitudes to fit the role they had assumed, and they revised their 
thinking about student “prisoners” to justify their oppressive 
behavior.20 Zimbardo’s experiment illustrates the dark side of 
Festinger’s predictions. And since the “guards” and “prisoners” had 
originated as ordinary students randomly selected for the role, the 
experiment also shows the power of the dissonance phenomenon. 
Ordinary people, having no particular inclination toward evil, will 
engage in evil behavior if the alignment of their behavior and their 
self-perceptions induces them. By implication, prevention of evil 
conduct requires affirmative intervention, rather than assumptions 
about the good that there is in people. Enforcement needs to be 
proactive. 
C. Small Steps: How Cognitive Dissonance Works to Induce Behavior 
Gradually 
In a way, the picture is even gloomier than this description of 
Zimbardo’s experiment suggests. Observation confirms that it is 
easier to induce individuals to shift attitudes if they already have 
taken steps in the desired direction. Jonathan Freedman and Scott 
Frazer conducted an experiment that involved asking a control group 
of homeowners to post large, ugly signs saying “Drive Carefully.”21 
 
 17. See generally ZIMBARDO, supra note 5. 
 18. Id. at 73, 106, 119–20, 122, 172, 175; see also ARONSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 
285–87 (discussing Zimbardo’s experiment and its meaning); GILOVICH ET AL., supra note 
11, at 4–14 (same). 
 19. ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 174–94. 
 20. Id. at 219–20. 
 21. Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-in-
the-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 195–202 (1966). 
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Fewer than twenty percent consented. At the same time, a second 
group of homeowners were asked to display a tiny, three-inch card, 
and many agreed. A few days later, the second group of homeowners 
who had accepted the tiny sign were asked to accept the big, ugly 
sign. This time, nearly eighty percent agreed. “Small steps”—the 
second group’s earlier acceptance of the tiny cards—had changed 
their attitudes toward the big signs. The experimenters described the 
phenomenon as “the foot-in-the-door” technique.22 
As another example, political regimes that use torture would be 
able to recruit torturers by small steps: first, by having newcomers 
stand guard, then by having them observe, and then by inducing 
minor participation.23 Perhaps cognitive dissonance, in part, explains 
why this “small steps” technique works. Having accepted and 
become a part of the behavior, the subject adjusts cognition 
(attitudes) to justify the behavior, even when it consists as yet only of 
small steps. 
D. Entrapment in Escalation: From the Dollar Auction to the 
Concorde Fallacy 
The phenomenon known as “entrapment in escalation” is 
illustrated by experiments based upon the “dollar auction.” In the 
dollar auction, an auctioneer announces that he will exchange a one 
dollar bill for a payment from the highest bidder. The catch is that 
the next-highest bidder also must pay his or her bid.24 Therefore, as 
the bidding closes in on a dollar, players scramble to avoid becoming 
the next-highest bidder, a phenomenon that often sends the bids up 
to amounts exceeding one dollar. Thus, there are three crucial 
junctures in the dollar auction: the second bid (which means that 
there now is going to be a loser), the first bid over fifty cents (which 
means that the auctioneer will profit from the players), and of 
course, the “magic moment” (the first bid that exceeds one dollar).25 
 
 22. Id.; see also BARON & BYRNE, supra note 11, at 389; GILOVICH ET AL., supra note 
11, at 244–45. 
 23. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 382. It should be added that the small steps phenomenon 
can be used to induce good behavior as well as bad behavior. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 
450. 
 24. Martin Shubik, The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior 
and Escalation, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 109, 109–11 (1971). 
 25. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 477–78. 
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The dollar auction models a number of real-world events. One 
example, the “Concorde Fallacy,” as it is called, takes its name from 
the supersonic airliner produced by a British-French consortium, for 
which costs escalated.26 Even after it was apparent to an objective 
observer that the economically sound strategy was to cut and run, 
both governments increased their levels of commitment because they 
had “too much invested to quit.”27 The Concorde Fallacy mirrors 
the dollar auction because a similar psychological trap has been 
observed in dollar auction experiments, with astonishing results. 
Experimenters typically give subjects sums ranging from $2.50 to 
$20 to bid, and often the escalation continues until players have 
exhausted all of their funds. In some experiments, the subjects have 
become distraught to the point of crying, even as they continue to 
bid and run out their money. This “entrapment” phenomenon 
occurs in high percentages of experiments.28 
Why does it happen? One group of experiments surveyed 
subjects during dollar-auction play and concluded that a change in 
motivation develops.29 The initial economic motivation, which is to 
have a good time by trying to obtain something for less than its 
value, gives way to a competitive urge that obscures the player’s 
initial goals. Another group of experimenters tied the motive to face-
saving.30  
In addition to the dollar auction and the Concorde Fallacy, there 
are many examples of entrapment in escalation. Consider the 
uneconomical, yet unresolvable lawsuit or dispute. It sometimes 
occurs that parties to a lawsuit spend more in pretrial preparation 
than the amount at issue and still find themselves unable to settle 
their dispute short of a trial that will more than double the 
expenditures of each. Likewise, it sometimes happens that lawyers 
representing labor and management are unable to end a strike that 
has produced losses far exceeding any possible gains. The arms race 
 
 26. See Hal. R. Arkes & Peter Ayton, The Sunk Cost and Concorde Effects: Are Humans 
Less Rational Than Lower Animals?, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 591, 591 (1999). 
 27. ALLAN I. TEGER, TOO MUCH INVESTED TO QUIT 1 (1980) (explaining the 
phenomenon in these terms). 
 28. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 478 (explaining the entrapment). 
 29. TEGER, supra note 27, at 15–17, 91. 
 30. CRUMP, supra note 7, at 479. They also produced evidence tending to demonstrate 
that men are more susceptible to entrapment in escalation than women. But neither gender 
should claim superiority, because experiments with other games show men acting less 
aggressively and more cooperatively than women. Id. 
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between the United States and the former Soviet Union has often 
been similarly analyzed by game theorists.31 
It is not difficult to relate the entrapment-in-escalation 
phenomenon to the outgrowth of widespread police corruption in 
Los Angeles. As Officer Raphael Perez testified, “The ‘us against 
them’ ethos of the overzealous cop began to consume me.”32 After 
beginning with small steps, Officer Perez may have found himself 
trapped in an escalating pattern of repeated crimes.33 
E. Implications of Dissonance-Related Phenomena for the Law 
Unfortunately, theories and experiments do not always hold clear 
implications for behavior modification, and in this area we encounter 
a need for speculation. Psychology is not an exact science, like some 
areas in physics, and the conclusions that follow are imperfect. 
Human beings are complicated. They differ markedly from 
individual to individual and group to group. Nevertheless, some 
conclusions can be stated with confidence, even if others cannot.  
Observations related to cognitive dissonance confirm that it is a 
dangerous phenomenon. As the Romans put it, “facilis descensus 
Avernum”—roughly translated, “the descent to Hell is easy”—and 
the truth of this saying is experimentally verifiable in the examples 
discussed above.34 The question that people naturally asked about 
the crimes within the LAPD, or at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, should 
be stood on its head. The sensible question is not, “How could these 
things happen?” Instead, it is: “It’s going to happen!” Given 
cognitive dissonance phenomena, Zimbardo’s experiment, and the 
small steps observation, shouldn’t we, rather, expect these kinds of 
bad behavior to occur, in the absence of strong measures to prevent 
them?35  
Social psychology tells us that small steps are important here: 
social psychology tells us to expect them.36 A police officer in the 
 
 31. Id. at 479. 
 32. Glover & Lait, supra note 1, at A2. 
 33. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
 34. Such as Zimbardo’s prison experiment. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying 
text. 
 35. In fact, Zimbardo and others have applied his experimental findings to the analysis 
of the Abu Ghraib misconduct. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 324–79; GILOVICH ET AL., 
supra note 11, at 3–5. 
 36. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
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Ramparts Division of LAPD may have started the process by 
observing and tolerating a cover-up in a minor aspect of a police 
report, and then by writing false reports himself. An accountant at 
Enron may have approved a trader’s claimed hedge strategy that 
posed a small risk of being self-funded, and then may have graduated 
to bigger prevarications. A National Guardsman at Abu Ghraib may 
have begun the descent toward major abuses by participating in a 
slight humiliation of a prisoner. The theory of cognitive dissonance 
predicts the effect of these actions.37 Attitudes change. The police 
officer sees the false report as a necessary law enforcement tool, the 
Enron accountant perceives his manipulations as the proper response 
to a novel situation in which normal rules (for example, Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles) do not apply to the cutting-edge 
transactions of a spectacularly innovative company, and the 
guardsman at Abu Ghraib imagines himself to be performing an 
essential part in prisoner interrogation, rather than committing a war 
crime. Finally, the entrapment-in-escalation phenomenon and 
Zimbardo’s prison experiment show that once the police officer, 
accountant, or soldier takes on his or her respective role, the role 
tends to take on a life of its own—and to make a good person’s 
commitment to bad behaviors more pervasive.38  
These conclusions suggest that lawmakers must adopt special 
measures if they are to counteract bad behavior induced by 
dissonance-related phenomena. Lawmakers must call for proactive 
enforcement. Rules designed to “nip abuses in the bud” may be 
especially effective. At Abu Ghraib, the sudden placement of soldiers 
into a hastily organized prison, headed by officers with no relevant 
experience, was a predictable disaster.39 Instead of inducing 
professional behavior through good-hearted people, the Government 
established an environment that fostered mistreatment. If lawmakers 
are to prevent this kind of behavior, they must establish clear norms, 
ensure that they are enforceable, and immediately condemn even 
small variations from them. The Government should hold superior 
officers responsible for this policy, as the Army in fact finally did with 
 
 37. See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text. 
 38. See supra notes 17–20, 24–33 and accompanying text. 
 39. See generally supra note 35 and authority therein cited. 
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respect to Abu Ghraib—although too late for prevention, at least this 
time.40 
Along the same lines, Congress reacted to major corporate 
financial scandals by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,41 
which holds high-level executives liable for the enforcement of 
accounting policies through certification requirements.42 Critics have 
suggested that Sarbanes-Oxley imposes enormous financial costs, 
which may be far out of proportion to its contribution to market 
integrity.43 That may be so, particularly with respect to some 
provisions. An evaluation of the financial costs imposed by Sarbanes-
Oxley is beyond the scope of this Article, but undoubtedly the 
burden on particular executives, individual companies, and the 
economy as a whole is staggering. However, cognitive dissonance 
theory suggests that some of the measures contained in Sarbanes-
Oxley are appropriately targeted. Likewise, perhaps the “broken 
windows” theory advanced by James Q. Wilson (and used apparently 
to such positive effect in New York City while Rudolph Giuliani was 
mayor) can be justified by these considerations. The broken windows 
theory asserts that intolerance of small crimes, such as aggressive 
panhandling, minor drug dealing, and vandalism, also prevents major 
crimes, such as rapes, robberies, or murders.44 Again, it is a matter of 
preventing small steps! 
 
 40. Brigadier General Janis Karpinsky was relieved of command of the 800th Military 
Police Brigade and demoted to colonel. Also, Colonel Thomas Pappas was relieved of 
command of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and reprimanded. Robert Burns, Colonel 
Loses Command in Abuse Scandal, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 13, 2005, at A4. 
 41. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
various sections of Title 15 of the United States Code). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Gary M. Brown, Approaching Securities Laws, in PRACTICING LAW 
INSTITUTE, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 17, 17–18 (2007) (describing the Act as 
“dominat[ing]” corporate practice and as “sweeping”). 
 44. The thesis appears to have originated in James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, 
Broken Windows, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29. For discussion, see Robert C. Ellickson, 
Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space 
Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171, 1182 (1996) (explaining the thesis). But see Bernard E. 
Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City 
Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 314–16 (2006) (concluding that there is no 
empirical evidence that proves that police action against minor crime reduces major crime). 
For a discussion of how the broken windows theory fits the reduction of environmental 
pollution, see ARONSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 519–21 (suggesting that people are more 
likely to litter if the environment is already full of litter). 
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III. PERSUASION TOWARD WRONGDOING 
In addition to cognitive dissonance effects, persuasion and 
authority within group settings can motivate people to adopt 
behaviors they would not otherwise consider. “Persuasion” includes 
a wide variety of mechanisms that supply human motivation. 
Persuasion need not be either overt or direct. In fact, it can be 
extraordinarily indirect. To put the issue another way, if a LAPD 
veteran had attempted to persuade Officer Perez to engage in his 
crimes by saying, “The objective is to perjure yourself,” this method 
of persuasion would likely be ineffective to a new recruit. But there 
are other mechanisms of persuasion. 
A. Conformity and Group Influences: Asch’s Experiments 
Solomon Asch’s conformity studies are classic in the social 
psychology of persuasion. They have disheartening implications for 
our hopes about independent thinking or for resistance to group 
lawbreaking. Asch used a diagram with a test line and three 
comparison lines of differing lengths. He showed them to a group of 
stooges and to an experimental subject. See Figure 1. 
 
Thus, he was able to test suggestibility toward conformity from 
group influence.45  
 After the stooges each identified one of the comparison lines, 
which obviously did not fit, as matching the test line, Asch invited 
the experimental subject’s response. In other words, two or three 
 
 45. See SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 451–95 (1987); Solomon E. Asch, 
Opinions and Social Pressure, SCI. AM., Nov. 1955, at 31–33. 
CRUMP.FIN  11/24/2008 8:36 PM 
1441] The Social Psychology of Evil 
 1453 
stooges first would identify line 1 (or line 3) as matching the test line 
in Figure 1, even though the mismatch is obvious. Then, the 
experimenter would ask the unsuspecting subject which line was the 
best fit. While subjects in the control groups erred less than one 
percent of the time,46 Asch noted that “[s]eventy five percent of 
experimental subjects agree[d] with the majority in varying 
degrees.”47 Subjects often reacted to the stooges’ choices with 
astonished looks and puzzled squinting. Asch’s conclusion was that 
“the tendency to conformity in our society [is] so strong that 
reasonably intelligent and well-meaning young people are willing to 
call white black.”48  
In groups, “norms” arise, and they give rise to what is called the 
“normative group influence,” a pressure toward conformity, as 
opposed to the “informational group influence,” by which a group 
can take advantage of the notion that “many heads are better than 
one.”49 A norm is an accepted rule for proper social behavior. The 
normative influence of a group is its suggestion of conformity (which 
may be good, as in the case of positive examples such as group 
courtesies, or bad, as Asch’s experiment shows). The informational 
group influence, on the other hand, reflects the greater experience or 
knowledge of several people rather than one.  
Imagine, for example, that a group is asked, “What foreign 
country do you first enter if you start at the center of Detroit and 
travel due south?” When one member of the group persuades the 
others that the answer is Canada because the waterway separating 
that country from the United States makes a reverse S shape 
immediately below Detroit, the informational influence is at work. 
But if a member of the group who knew the correct answer 
(Canada) were to adopt an erroneous answer (Mexico) because all 
other group members chose that response, the normative group 
influence would have won out.50 
 
 46. Asch, supra note 45, at 33. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 34; see also ARONSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 256–57 (discussing how the 
one person who does not go along with the majority may face consequences); BARON & 
BYRNE, supra note 11, at 358–86 (discussing Asch’s work); GILOVICH ET AL., supra note 11, 
at 220–31 (same). 
 49. See CRUMP, supra note 7, at 384–85. 
 50. Id. at 385. 
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There are factors that increase conformity to suggestion, as well 
as factors that decrease it.51 Subsequent experiments have shown that 
conformity to group suggestion is stronger if a sense of inferiority or 
insecurity is induced in the subject. The absence of prior 
commitment against the suggestion, as well as membership in a 
culture that values conformity, also are strengthening factors. 
Unanimity of the group makes for more powerful suggestion than if 
the subject has an agreeing companion, and so does a high-status 
group, or a group with expertise. Group size also matters, but the 
effect seems to level off at a size ranging from three to seven, 
depending on the experiment. And, of course, ambiguity of the 
correct response increases conformity.52  
In the Ramparts Division of the LAPD, the normative group 
influence and the conformity phenomenon seem likely to have been 
factors in persuading officers to engage in lawbreaking. A new officer 
probably has a sense of inferiority or insecurity, perhaps even physical 
insecurity. He or she becomes a member of a culture that values 
conformity, and the veteran officers presumably are a high-status 
group, as well as a group with expertise. The new officer finds 
himself or herself in conditions in which by-the-book methods often 
do not produce results and often are not the accepted practice, so 
that the new officer finds ambiguity in making correct decisions.53 Of 
course, there also are factors to the contrary. Most recruits 
presumably come in with a prior commitment to follow the law and 
avoid perjury. Also, it seems probable that there is a lack of 
unanimity among the group of lawbreakers (because surely some 
officers at times act with propriety, and thus they provide a 
counterexample). But Asch’s experiment shows that the influence 
toward conformity is powerful. Similarly, the guardsman-turned-
jailer at Abu Ghraib prison seems vulnerable to group influences,54 
and so does the neophyte accountant surrounded by lawbreaking at a 
place like Enron. 
 
 51. Id. at 386. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Cf. Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 516 (2004) (analyzing how formal training is “quickly undermined” by 
contradictory messages in the field). 
 54. Cf. ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 263–65 (discussing Asch’s work in the context of 
Zimbardo’s prison experiment). 
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Asch’s conformity experiments may explain why states that allow 
juries to return non-unanimous jury verdicts in civil cases do not 
limit them to eleven-to-one votes. More commonly, verdicts of ten 
to two, nine to three, or even eight to four, can support a 
judgment.55 When the votes are eleven to one, the conformity 
influence is at its most powerful, and social science predicts that a 
unanimous verdict is likely anyway. A law allowing eleven-to-one 
verdicts would not affect many cases. But if there are two or three 
holdouts, each serves to provide a role model to the other that 
undermines the unanimity of the group suggestion, and a hung jury 
is much more likely. If the jurisdiction really wants to minimize hung 
juries, it needs to allow nine-to-three or ten-to-two verdicts, and not 
just eleven-to-one verdicts. 
B. Authority as a Factor in Persuasion 
Conformity is not the only mechanism of group suggestion. 
Authority is another. And, while the findings about conformity 
discussed above are cause for concern, the results of experiments 
with authority are even more so. They are downright scary. 
Stanley Milgram’s authority experiments are a landmark 
example.56 Milgram set up a phony “experimenter” in an official-
looking white lab coat, who actually was a stooge, and who 
instructed subjects to administer electrical “shocks” to a strapped-
down “learner” whenever the learner made errors.57 The scale for the 
“shocks” began at “15 volts (‘Slight’ Shock),” and went through 
“150 volts (‘Strong’ Shock),” all the way to 450 volts.58 But in 
reality there were no shocks, and the learner also was a stooge who 
both erred intentionally and grunted or gasped in pain at the lower 
 
 55. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revising the Unanimity Requirement: The 
Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 203 (2006) (“[O]nly 
eighteen states require unanimity and another three accept a non-unanimous verdict after six 
hours of deliberation. The remaining states permit super-majorities of between two-thirds and 
five-sixths in civil cases.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 56. Milgram was Asch’s student and was familiar with Asch’s conformity experiments. 
He got the idea for his own studies by considering Asch’s work but shifted his thinking to a 
focus on experimental control rather than group control. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 266. 
For Zimbardo’s discussion of Milgram’s work, see id. at 266–272. See also ARONSON ET AL., 
supra note 11, at 519–21 (discussing Milgram’s work); BARON & BYRNE, supra note 11, at 
272–79; GILOVICH ET AL., supra note 11, at 10–11. 
 57. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 268–69. 
 58. See id. at 269. 
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settings.59 At 120 volts, the stooge playing the part of the learner 
protested that the shocks were painful; at 150 the stooge (through a 
voice recorder) shouted that he wanted “to be released from the 
experiment, complaining of a heart disturbance.”60 
If the subject faltered, the experimenter responded firmly that 
“the experiment requires that you go on.”61 At “180 volts,” the 
learner shouted that he “couldn’t stand” the pain;62 at 300, 
responses stopped, and the experimenter told the subject to treat a 
non-response as a wrong answer.63 Most subjects who “prematurely” 
terminated this charade were highly agitated, and so were those who 
continued, protesting all the way, to 450 volts.64 The white-jacketed 
“experimenter” used the same simple technique every time a subject 
hesitated, telling the subject that “the experiment requires you to 
continue” or words to that effect.65 
Astonishingly, more than sixty percent of the subjects continued 
to the end of the scale while hearing agonized cries from the 
stooge.66 Milgram’s conclusion was that “ordinary people” were 
sufficiently obedient to purported authority that they could readily 
be engaged in a “terribly destructive process.”67 It does not take 
much extrapolation to infer that some people can similarly be 
influenced to violate the law, even when harmful results are clear. 
What kinds of circumstances strengthen or reduce the effect of 
authority? Later experiments showed that a high-status authority 
tended to increase obedience. If the phony “experimenter” was 
introduced as a professor from a prestigious university, for example, 
subjects obeyed more readily than if the “experimenter” claimed 
affiliation with a lesser university. The presence of a disobeying role 
model reduced obedience. Physical factors, such as close proximity of 
the authority giving instructions or distance of the person harmed 
 
 59. Id. at 270. 
 60. Stanley Milgram, Group Pressure and Action Against a Person, 69 J. ABNORMAL & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 139 (1964) [hereinafter Milgram, Group Pressure]; see also Stanley 
Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371 (1963) 
[hereinafter Milgram, Obedience]. 
 61. Milgram, Obedience, supra note 60, at 374. 
 62. Milgram, Group Pressure, supra note 60, at 139. 
 63. ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 268–69. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Milgram, Obedience, supra note 60, at 374; see also authorities cited supra note 56. 
 66. ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 271. 
 67. See authorities cited supra note 56. 
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(for example, by walling the “learner” off in another room), 
reinforced obedience. More recent experiments have shown that 
depersonalization of the experimental subject, such as the wearing of 
a mask, makes the subject more obedient to either group conformity 
or to authority suggestions that might otherwise be resisted.68 
These experimental results suggest a reason why the so-called 
Nuremberg Defense,69 offered by an actor whose crime is alleged to 
have occurred during the execution of a military order, is properly 
viewed by courts with suspicion. Specifically, the experiments 
indicate that resistance to authority should be encouraged when the 
objective is transparently illegal because authority is a more powerful 
motivator toward harmful action than one might have supposed. 
Thus, although the Model Penal Code provides an affirmative 
defense for a military actor who “execute[s] an order,” the defense 
applies only if the actor “does not know [the order] to be 
unlawful.”70 The inapplicability of the defense to orders known to be 
illegal may seem a minimal concession at first glance, but it actually is 
strong medicine. It requires soldiers to disobey rules about the chain 
of command that have been drilled forcefully into them, even 
though they may face severe consequences from their rectitude. 
Milgram’s experiments show the necessity for such a limit upon the 
defense. 
IV. THE NECESSITY OF ENFORCEMENT 
Social psychology leads to a wide variety of conclusions, most of 
which must be regarded as tentative. The clearest conclusion, 
probably, is that enforceability of legal norms, as well as actual 
enforcement, is important. Inclinations toward bad behavior within 
groups are surprisingly strong. The dissonance phenomenon, 
particularly when actors take on roles, induces overreaction. The 
small-steps phenomenon, authority response, and conformity 
influence show that minor and occasional violation easily can expand 
 
 68. See CRUMP, supra note 7, at 386. 
 69. So called because lower-ranking officials offered it at war crimes trials held in 
Nuremberg, Germany after World War II. This defense is the claim that a soldier was following 
orders, and thus cannot be held culpable for the violation of any laws those actions may have 
violated. See Henry T. King, Jr., The Legacy of Nuremberg, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 335, 
340 (2002). 
 70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).  
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to become pervasive. Continuous correction of this tendency is 
needed. 
A. Bottom-Up Enforcement and Top-Down Enforcement 
All of these considerations suggest that visible, responsive, and 
constant enforcement of pre-set norms is more important than one 
might think to prevent bad behavior from growing within a group. 
Without enforcement, conduct that reasonable people recognize as 
not just unacceptable, but as obviously and seriously unacceptable, 
should nevertheless be expected to emerge because the social 
psychology amply shows how human beings will redefine bad 
conduct so that it becomes acceptable—and will propagate it 
through their peers and underlings.71 Bottom-up enforcement of 
group norms can take the form of conformity to group suggestion 
that counteracts potentially immoral orders from the top.72 Top-
down enforcement also plays an important role because it takes 
advantage of the authority phenomenon and counteracts the 
emergence of antisocial authority (rogue managers) as well as peers 
who influence others toward misconduct.73 Several kinds of 
conclusions about enforcement can be drawn from these statements. 
For example, large organizations that are well managed for 
compliance usually devise built-in enforcement methods when they 
contemplate their responses to new regulatory standards.74 Consider 
a chemical facility that must comply with clean air standards. The 
standards themselves often do not express any enforcement 
mechanism, and for that matter, they usually do not contain any 
algorithm for compliance.75 A team of compliance specialists, 
 
 71. The similarity between events at Abu Ghraib and Zimbardo’s prison experiment is a 
striking example. See supra notes 17–20, 34 and accompanying text. Milgram’s results are even 
more striking. See supra notes 56–68 and accompanying text. 
 72. Originally, the “human relations” movement, and later, “organizational theory,” 
emphasized the importance of the difference between rules and informal norms in 
management. See CRUMP, supra note 7, at 178. 
 73. Top-down management, often referred to as “administrative management,” is a part 
of classical theory that emphasized the integrity of the chain of command. See CRUMP, supra 
note 7, at 176–77 (discussing the “Fourteen Principles” of Management set out by Henry 
Fayol). 
 74. Interview with John J. Crump, former compliance engineer, Shell Chem. Corp., in 
Houston, Tx. (Nov. 14, 2007). 
 75. See, e.g., Rules and Regulations of the EPA, 40 C.F.R. § 63 (2007) (setting national 
standards for certain air pollutants; in 72 FR 38864-01). 
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separate from the employees who will actually carry out compliance 
duties, will be charged with responsibility for designing a checklist 
for the completion of those duties.76 The checklist will detail each 
individual step specified. Perhaps most importantly, it will include a 
mechanism by which enforcement is automatic. The chemically 
reactive column that the compliance employee is charged with 
maintaining will not function unless a particular switch is thrown, 
and the switch is installed so that it cannot be thrown unless the 
employee has performed all of the required steps.77  
This kind of mechanical solution is not always possible, but if 
not, the organization can promulgate rules that come close. The 
relatively simple solution of having a written checklist that must be 
signed by a supervisor, before the employee can consider the job 
complete, is an example. These kinds of processes are not fail-safe. 
Employees learn how to fool the compliance switch, and supervisors 
become lax about ensuring that the checklist that they sign has 
indeed been completed. The presence of enforcement mechanisms, 
however, would do some good in overcoming influences toward bad 
behavior, and it makes the detection of widespread abuses more 
likely. 
There are some kinds of policies that should be implemented 
from the top down. The company’s sexual harassment policy is an 
example. Human relations advice indicates that this policy should be 
authoritative, clear, and secure.78 Furthermore, checklist and fail-safe-
switch approaches are inapplicable to a problem that can assume an 
infinite variety of forms and for which communication and example 
are essential. Thus, the harassment policy should call for ready 
communication with managers—one’s immediate manager first, but 
with the option of climbing the entire chain if communication is 
unworkable with the immediate superior. Here, top-down 
enforcement means that the positive influence of authority, the 
factor that proved so powerfully negative in Milgram’s experiments,79 
will provide a check against the influence of cognitive dissonance, 
 
 76. Interview with John J. Crump, supra note 74. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Linda Ottinger Headley & Katherine E. Flanagan, Harassment, Sexual and 
Otherwise, in UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON LAW FOUNDATION, ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW 
FOR EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS 50–53 (2006). 
 79. See supra notes 56–68 and accompanying text. 
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small steps, conformity, and other factors that can create bottom-up 
harassment.80 
B. Designing Avenues for Automatic Enforcement at the Time 
Regulations Are Promulgated 
In order to be effective, measures aimed at preventing the spread 
of bad behavior must be enforceable. It is perfectly possible to design 
legislation that is impossible to enforce. For example, consider the 
city that wrote its prohibition of farm and exotic animals so that it 
defined a misdemeanor that did not apply to anyone “in the business 
of keeping animals.”81 The local district attorney found it necessary 
to decline enforcement of this provision.82 Even if an individual 
maintained a herd of goats beside his or her patio home, no 
prosecutor could prove that the individual was not “in the business 
of keeping animals.”83 Since the prohibition was unenforceable, 
residents who wanted to keep pigs or goats would probably do so. 
They might begin with small steps—one pig or goat—and begin to 
see themselves as freedom fighters against the totalitarian city. Then, 
the conformity urge probably would ensure that others imitated the 
behavior. 
The city could have produced a result closer to the one it desired 
by thinking of enforceability. One simple way to solve its problem 
would have been to provide that the “business of keeping animals” 
was not an element of the offense that the prosecution needed to 
negate, but rather an affirmative defense upon which the goat herd 
would have both the burden of producing evidence and the burden 
of persuasion.84 This approach might not furnish the best solution, 
but it would have enabled the district attorney in the situation 
described above to initiate misdemeanor cases rather than declining 
prosecution. A better solution, perhaps, would have been to set up a 
 
 80. Social psychological experiments show that this kind of accountability and 
responsibility is effective. See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 255–56 (discussing the 
experiments). 
 81. See DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND LAWYERING 
STRATEGIES 117–18 (2005) (paraphrasing such a statute). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 118 (explaining why such a case is not prosecutable, in spite of students’ 
frequent enthusiasm for creative evidence gathering). 
 84. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2) (creating affirmative defenses; providing for 
proof by defendant in some cases). 
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permit or registration system and to define the misdemeanor as 
keeping one or more of the non-urban animals without a permit or 
registration.85 This approach would have made enforcement much 
easier, although it would not have avoided the need for some court 
actions. If even a couple of ersatz freedom fighters ever formed the 
impression that enforcement of the law against non-permitted goat 
herds was lacking, social psychology suggests that violations would 
have crept in and grown. 
Sometimes government enforcement is not the only way for a 
law to work against cognitively dissonant, small-stepped, conforming 
violators. For example, a withholding system makes income taxes 
much more readily collectable.86 The employer is virtually required 
to function as the analogue of a fail-safe switch by the knowledge 
that failure to withhold creates liability.87 The result is widespread (if 
not perfect) payment of income taxes by salaried employees. This 
factor is built into the Internal Revenue Code for precisely this 
reason. A less planned outcome, but a serendipitous one, occurs 
when the mortgage banking industry sets up escrows that collect and 
pay local property taxes.88 A lender is motivated to enforce 
compliance because it can lose its security if a tax-related foreclosure 
takes the property from the borrower.  
But even if these means of private enforcement are not available, 
and a government system is necessary, social psychology strongly 
suggests that regulators should build enforcement into their 
regulations from the beginning. They should understand the kinds 
of algorithms that firms in the regulated industry will need to 
promulgate for compliance. In other words, regulators should not 
simply create standards and wait for compliance officers in each firm 
to invent methods for meeting them; instead, they should have 
 
 85. Cf. UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT §§ 301–309 (1994) (setting up 
registration system). 
 86. See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1990) (explaining the withholding system 
enacted by Congress). 
 87. 36 U.S.C. § 3402(d) (2000) (stating that the employee is responsible for the taxes 
“but this subsection shall in no case relieve the employer from liability for any penalties” for 
failing to withhold the taxes). 
 88. For cases illustrating such a requirement, see In re Ma, 375 B.R. 387, 391 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 2007); Fournigault v. Independence One Mortgage Corp., 242 F.R.D. 486 (N.D. 
Ill. 2007). See also DAVID CRUMP ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND LAWYERING 
STRATEGIES 263, 265–66 (2003) (explaining the requirement; reproducing a mortgage 
instrument containing such a requirement). 
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concrete awareness that plans for step-by-step, fail-safe enforcement, 
or methods that overcome inducements toward noncompliance can 
be created. They should adjust the wording of each standard so that 
it can be made the subject of an effective algorithm for reliable, 
enforceable compliance. 
This is not to say that government should mandate any particular 
enforcement algorithm that it considers in promulgating its standard. 
Often, that approach is inefficient if what is sought is compliance 
with a standard. The market may produce better compliance 
mechanisms, or it may be best served by different mechanisms in 
different situations. The point is only that government should 
consider the availability of enforcement algorithms when it designs 
its standards. To put the matter another way, if one type of standard 
seems attractive in terms of the results it promises but is difficult to 
enforce, a standard that produces slightly lesser results but is reliably 
enforceable may actually be preferable. 
C. Implications of These Conclusions for the Examples That Began This 
Article 
What would social psychology mean for, say, rules governing 
jailers at Abu Ghraib prison—the site of those novice guards’ 
astounding abuse of inmates, which subjected some of them to later 
prosecution and impaired the international reputation of the United 
States? Social psychology speaks clearly in at least one respect: the 
likelihood of occurrence of this kind of abuse. The probability that 
dissonance, role, small steps, and conformity will induce bad 
behavior is high, as Zimbardo’s prison experiment shows. The 
question is not, “How could such behavior have happened?” but 
rather “Shouldn’t we expect it to happen?” And so, the first step in 
regulating this kind of bad behavior is to assume that it will happen, 
that it will be imitated, and that it will be widespread—unless 
managers take serious steps against it. The second step is to set up 
regulations that have a meaningful chance of preventing it. And the 
third consideration is to think of enforceability—by automatic means 
to the extent possible, and by intervention of authority to the extent 
needed—and to provide for it. 
Enforceability in this case is the hardest issue, as it often is in 
many cases. In a situation such as that at Abu Ghraib, one idea that 
might make sense is to make sure that the individual acting as 
warden has personal responsibility for taking active steps against 
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prisoner abuse. The social psychological literature shows without 
question that imposing appropriately calibrated responsibility upon 
the chief executive invokes the power of authority to bring about 
sound results,89 and the chief executive can use more subtle, varied, 
and effective methods than the law can.90  
The effects of communication, instruction, and example can be 
powerful in achieving compliance, as social science shows.91 This 
concept seems obvious but is not. The United States Army took 
steps to hold the responsible general accountable for Abu Ghraib 
after the fact, but by then it was too late for either prevention or 
serious enforcement.92 At lower levels, a serious policy regulating bad 
behavior by guards would require a report from any individual 
having non-routine contact with a prisoner. It would invest middle 
managers, from colonels down to sergeants, with personal 
responsibility for ensuring that reports of the kind are made—and for 
condemning nonconforming conduct. Further, it would contain 
policies for dealing with common troublesome incidents, such as the 
need to invade a cell to remove a recalcitrant prisoner. This policy 
would be based upon awareness of a practical procedure, an 
algorithm, so that a team with clear responsibilities could remove the 
prisoner with least risk to themselves and with minimal harm to the 
prisoner. Similar considerations apply to a police department, such as 
the one in Los Angeles that experienced widespread official 
misconduct.  
These same principles probably apply to the Enron situation. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for all of the criticism that has been leveled at it, 
seemed to create the kinds of legal standards that will address Enron-
type abuses by making those in authority personally responsible for 
financial statements. Such a standard is enforceable. It avoids the 
negation of the standard by divided responsibility among executives, 
accountants, and lawyers, a division that means none is accountable 
because all have deniability of the crucial knowledge. On the other 
hand, the criticisms of Sarbanes-Oxley may also have merit. Its 
sponsors probably should have considered compliance algorithms as 
 
 89. See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 255–57. 
 90. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 5, at 451–56 (offering “a ten-step program to resist 
unwanted influences”). 
 91. Id. at 456. 
 92. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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part of their definition of the standard. That approach might have 
maximized enforceability while reducing costs. In the end, it may 
prove true that Sarbanes-Oxley costs much more than any benefits 
that it could ever provide. That is a question for another article. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In all of these cases, the solutions are similar. The first 
consideration is to expect abuses whenever dissonance phenomena, 
roles, small steps, and conformity indicate that they are likely. As a 
corollary, prevention requires setting aside blind faith that every 
individual’s inherent goodness will minimize bad behavior. The 
second consideration is to set up regulations that target the expected 
behavior. Third, the regulations should be designed with 
enforcement in mind. Finally, the necessary level and kind of 
enforcement that may be needed should be projected and provided. 
 
 
 
